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Abstract
This Note analyzes the PRC’s claim that, according to accepted principles of international law,
it is justified in abrogating the Treaty of Nanking. The basis for the PRC’s position is that the treaty
is not reciprocal in its terms and is the product of coercion. Therefore, according to the PRC, the
Treaty is unequal and nonbinding. The first part of this Note provides the historical background
surrounding the conclusion of the Treaty of Nanking. Part II briefly defines the principle of pacta
sunt servanda and examines problems that arise when the rule is applied to unequal treaties. Part
III presents a two-part analysis of whether execptions to pacta sunt servanda exist, and, if so,
whether the Treaty of Nanking falls within the exceptions.
HONG KONG'S FUTURE: CAN THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA INVALIDATE
THE TREATY OF NANKING
AS AN UNEQUAL TREATY?
INTRODUCTION
In 1898, Great Britain and Imperial China concluded a treaty'
that leased to Great Britain an area constituting over two-thirds of
Hong Kong. 2 The other third of Hong Kong 3 had previously been
ceded to Great Britain as a term of the Treaty of Nanking in
the aftermath of the Opium War. The People's Republic of China
(PRC) contends that when the lease terminates in 1997, 5 the ceded
area should also revert to the PRC's control.6 Private negotiations
between the two countries are currently being conducted to deter-
mine the fate of Hong Kong and its inhabitants. 7 The PRC has
announced that an agreement must be reached with Great Britain
by September 1984.8
This Note analyzes the PRC's claim that, according to ac-
cepted principles of international law, it is justified in abrogating
the Treaty of Nanking." The basis for the PRC's position is that the
1. Convention Respecting an Extension of Hong Kong Territory, June 9, 1898, China-
Great Britain, 90 Brit. For. 17, 32 Martens Nouveau Receuil 89 [hereinafter cited as Lease].
2. N.Y. Times, May 16, 1983, at A2, col. 3. Hong Kong is composed of two separate
areas: Kowloon, a peninsula attached to mainland China, and Victoria Island. Id. The island
was ceded to Great Britain in the Treaty of Nanking, Aug. 29, 1842, China-Great Britain, 30
Brit. For. 389, 93 Parry's T.S. 465. Fifty years later, the lease was concluded to increase the
area under British control, because the British believed "that an extension of Hong Kong...
[was] necessary for the proper defence and protection of the Colony." Lease, supra note 1.
3. The other third of Hong Kong is Victoria Island. See supra note 2.
4. Treaty of Nanking, supra note 2.
5. See Lease, supra note 1.
6. Furhman, Hong Kong is Adjusting to the "1997 Jitters,'" Nat'l L.J., July 11, 1983, at
26, col. 1; see Hong Kong is Chinese Territory, Jen-min Jih-pao [JMJP], Aug. 20, 1967, in 1
PEOPLE'S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 382 (J. Cohen & H. Chiu eds. 1974) [hereinafter
cited as 1 PEOPLE'S CHINA]. The views expressed in JMJP may be taken to reflect the official
policy of the People's Republic of China (PRC). See Treaty Relations oj the People's Republic
of China: A Study in Compliance, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 244, 249 (1967).
For a discussion of the PRC legislature indicating the PRC's intention to reclaim Hong
Kong, see Dicks, Position of Hong Kong & Macao in Recent Chinese Legislature, 4 H. K. L.J.
151, 159-60 (1974).
7. N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1983, at A3, col. 4.
8. Id.
9. See L. CHIEN, STATE SUCCESSION TO UNEQUAL TREATIES 29 (1974).
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treaty is not reciprocal in its terms and is the product of coercion.' 0
Therefore, according to the PRC, the Treaty is unequal" and non-
binding. 12
The first part of this Note provides the historical background
surrounding the conclusion of the Treaty of Nanking.13 Part II
briefly defines the principle of pacta sunt servanda14 and examines
problems that arise when the rule is applied to unequal treaties.' 5
Part III presents a two-part analysis of whether exceptions to pacta
sunt servanda exist,' 6 and, if so, whether the Treaty of Nanking
falls within the exceptions. 17
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Opium War
In the middle of the nineteenth century, Chinese silk and tea
were commodities greatly desired by Westerners.' 8 British mer-
chants, however, were unable to find a market in China for Euro-
pean commodities.' This resulted in a large trade deficit for Great
Britain. 20 To overcome this problem, British traders exploited the
large Chinese market for opium. 2' Their efforts, however, were
thwarted by Emperor Chia-ch'ing's prohibition against opium
10. See Varma, Unequal Treaties in Modern International Law, 7 E. J. INT'L L. 56
(1975).
11, Summary Records of the 684th Meeting, [1963] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 67, 69,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/156/Add.1/1963 (Statement by Mr. C. Tunkin, member of the Commis-
sion from the Soviet Union). The International Law Commission adopted the language used
by the Afro-Asian Jurist's Conference in defining unequal treaties as "treaties establishing
gross inequality between the obligations of the parties." Id.
12. See Varma, supra note 10, at 57.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 18-34.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 35-38.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 39-48.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 49-116.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 117-207.
18. J. POPE-HENNESSEY, HALF-CROwN COLONY 24 (1969).
19. Id. at 24-25.
20. I. Hsu, THE RISE OF MODERN CHINA 220 (2d ed. 1975). From 1781 to 1790, 16.4
million taels of silver were brought into China; then from 1800 to 1810, the British paid 26
million taels as trade increased. Id.
21. Id. Before British merchants began importing Indian opium into China, the British
paid for Chinese goods with silver. Thus, they were trading at a loss and currency was
flowing into China. When British traders began importing opium, the trade deficit was
eliminated, and the following year China suffered its first deficit. Id.
536 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 7:534
trading.12 British opium was confiscated and burned by the Impe-
rial Chinese government. 23 The British became extremely frustrated
by the unprofitable trading situation and their inability to obtain
any concessions through diplomatic channels. 24 Consequently,
Great Britain refused to recognize Chinese jurisdiction or financial
domination .2  The Opium War resulted. It began in 1839, and the
more modern British force easily overcame the ill-equipped Chinese
army.26 In 1842, China and Great Britain ended the war and signed
the Treaty of Nanking. 27
B. Treaty of Nanking
In effect, the Treaty of Nanking began the colonization of
Imperial China. 28 The treaty was described as being "imposed on
China at the mouth of the British fleet, and under the threat of an
assault on the City of Nanking by British troops." 29 The treaty
required China to open five ports for trade with Britain 30 and pay a
large indemnity. 31 It also imposed a fixed tarriff32 and transferred
Hong Kong "to be possessed by her Britannick Majesty, her Heirs,
22. W. TUNG, CHINA AND THE FOREIGN POWERS 19 (1970).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 21. For example, an Imperial Edict of 1757 restricted all trade to Canton.
E. HOLT, THE OPIUM WARS IN CHINA 31 (1964).
25. E. HOLT, supra note 24, at 102; see W. TUNG, supra note 22, at 7.
26. See G. SCOTT, CHINESE TREATIES 18-19 (1975); see also E. HOLT, supra note 24, at 21
(an analysis of the reasons behind China's lack of modernization).
27. W. TUNG, supra note 22, at 7. An in depth analysis of the factors surrounding the
Opium war and Anglo-Chinese relations during this period is provided in G. GRAHAM, THE
CHINA STATION WAR AND DIPLOMACY 1830-60 (1978).
28. See G. SCOTT, supra note 26, at 19-21. A number of treaties subsequently concluded
further eroded Chinese sovereignty. For an extensive analysis of the subsequent unequal
treaties following the Treaty of Nanking, see W. TUNG, supra note 22, at 21-67.
29. G. ScoTr, supra note 26, at 19 (quoting H. MORSE, 1 THE INTERNATIONAL RELA-
TIONS OF THE CHINESE EMPIRE 49 (1910)).
30. Treaty of Nanking, supra note 2, art. II. The ports were Canton, Amoy, Foochow-
foo, Ningpo, and Shanghai. Id.
31. Id. arts. IV, V, VI. The indemnity demanded of China consisted of Mex.$6 million
for confiscated opium. In addition, the British demanded Mex.$12 million for expenses
incurred during the war, and Mex.$3 million for debts due to British subjects from Hong
Kong merchants. Id. See generally J. CHESNEAX, M. BASTID, M. BERGERE, CHINA FROM THE
OPIUM WARS TO THE 1911 REVOLUTION 65 (A. Destenay trans. 1976).
32. Treaty of Nanking, supra note 2, art. X.
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and Successors. ' 33 In exchange, Great Britain agreed that there
would be peaceful relations between the two nations. 34
II. THE RULE OF PACTA SUNT SERVANDA
When states conclude a treaty they apply "a norm of custom-
ary international law, the rule pacta sunt servanda.'' 35 This rule
provides that treaties must be observed, or in other words, that they
have binding force. 36 Without this rule, treaty-making would be a
futile process because parties to treaties could evade their obliga-
tions without legal consequences. 37 Different views exist on whether
pacta sunt servanda requires parties to strictly observe unequal
treaties. 38
A. Traditional Policy
Nineteenth century writers believed that "[t]reaties were al-
ways to be observed under pacta sunt servanda.'' 39 The policy
reasons for validating all treaties, even those procured through
military coercion, were twofold:
33. Id. art. III.
34. Id. art. I.
35. H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 456 (2d ed. 1962). The principle of
pacta sunt servanda has been codified in article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969), reprinted in U.N. Doc. A/
Conf. 39/27 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Vienna Convention]. Article 26 states: "Every treaty
in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith."
Vienna Convention, supra, art. 26. For further discussion on the Vienna Convention, see
infra notes 62-91 and accompanying text.
36. H. KELSEN, supra note 35, at 456.
37. See Keenton, Extraterritoriality in International Law and Comparative Law, 72
RECUEIL DES Couns 287, 352 (1948).
38. Compare H. KELSEN, supra note 35, at 179 (strict observance of treaties is required
because the rule pacta sunt servanda is a norm of general international law that has perma-
nent validity and is thus "beyond the scope of ... limitation") with S. MALAWER, IMPOSED
TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (1977) (rule against imposed treaties "functions as an
exception to pacta sunt servanda").
39. S. MALAWER, supra note 38, at 18. The only qualification that has traditionally been
accepted is when coercion is used against the representative of a state. Id. at 5 n.I. Nine-
teenth century writers emphasized the difference between procuring an agreement through
coercion of an individual negotiating a treaty, and concluding a treaty through the coercion
of a state. Id. at 16-17. The former was illegal while the latter was valid. See M. BERNARD,
FOUR LECTURES ON SUBJECTS CONNECTED WITH DIPLOMACY 184-85 (London 1868); T. WOOL-
SEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 162 (6th rev. ed. 1899).
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First, the essential consideration was the need for a state to be
able to ensure its survival by consenting to an agreement to
prevent that state and its people from further destruction. Sec-
ond, there was the need to ensure the observation of treaties by
all states in the international community. 40
Although one of the fundamental principles of the national law of
civilized people is that the conclusion of a contract must be volun-
tary on both sides, at least one scholar has noted that traditional
international law fails to recognize this principle as applicable to
peace treaties. 41 In this regard, principles of national and interna-
tional law are egregiously inconsistent. 42 Historically, this inconsist-
ency has been tolerated by the international legal community for
the sake of fostering stable relations between nations. 43
B. New Policy Considerations
Recent evolution of international law has reflected state recog-
nition that aggressive war-making leads toward the destruction of
all nations' interest rather than the beneficial attainment of any
single state's ends. 44 In 1945, article 51 of the Charter of the United
Nations outlawed the use of military force in circumstances other
than self defense. 45 Immediately, a logical inconsistency arose in
international law. While aggressive military force was universally
acknowledged as being illegal, treaties procured through the use of
such force were not. 46 International legal scholars and states began
to recognize that because war was illegal, treaties procured through
40. S. MALAWER, supra note 38, at 18-19.
41. H. KELSEN, supra note 35, at 464. Kelsen examines the significance of voluntary
consent not being required to conclude peace treaties which "are among the most important
treaties." He characterizes this facet of international law as primitive. Id.
42. See id.
43. See S. MALAWER, supra note 38, at 19; cf. U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties,
2d Sess. (18th plen. mtg.) at 91, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/11/Add.1 (statement by Mr. R.
Binschelder, Delegate from Switzerland) [hereinafter cited as U.N. Conference].
44. See Tunkin, The Principal Developments in International Law During the Course
of the Last Half Century, 24 REVUE EGYPTIENNE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 1, 2 (1968). Tunkin
traces the development of a rule against war-making from the Kellogg-Briand Pact, General
Pact for the Renunciation of War, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 796, 94 L.N.T.S.
57, which was "the first multilateral treaty to prohibit aggressive war," to the Charter of the
United Nations. Id.
45. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
46. S. MALAWER, supra note 38, at 7-8.
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military coercion should lack binding force. 47 The development of a
rule which allows states to abrogate treaties in some circumstances
involves the creation of an exception to pacta sunt servanda.48
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN UNEQUAL
TREATY EXCEPTION
A. Does An Exception Exist?
1. Traditional Western Approach
When the principle of equality of states49 emerged during the
sixteenth century, the categorization of treaties as either equal or
unequal also began. 50 The issue of unequal treaties was framed in
moral rather than legal terms. 51 Grotius defined unequal treaties as
lacking reciprocity and imposing permanent or temporary burdens
on one of the parties. 52 Unequal treaties were characterized by
Vattel as "those in which the allies do not reciprocally promise to
each other the same things, or things equivalent. '53 Seventeenth
and eighteenth century writers also recognized that treaties im-
posed upon nations defeated in a war were unequal. 54 All of these
scholars acknowledged that unequal treaties were inequitable, but
none suggested that such treaties lacked binding force. 55
47. See infra notes 68, 75-84 and accompanying text.
48. See S. MALAWER, supra note 38, at 5. For example, the rule against imposed treaties
is an exception to pacta sunt servanda. Id.
49. See J. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 122-26 (1977). According to
Starke: "The doctrine of equality of States was espoused early in the modern history of
international law by those writers who attached importance to a relationship between the
law of nations and the law of nature." Id. at 122-23. Today the doctrine of equality of states
has become increasingly important as a principle guiding the relations between states, as
evidenced by the incorporation of the principle into the Charter of the United Nations. See
U.N. CHARTER arts. 1, 2.
50. Varma, supra note 10, at 56.
51. See L. CHEN, supra note 9, at 28-29 (examining various classical approaches to the
concept of unequal treaties, all of which posit the issue of unequal treaties in moral terms and
do not question their legal validity); but see I. BROWNLEE, PRINCIPLES OF PU3LIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 495-96 (1966) (unequal treaties are a legal problem which warrant the invalida-
tion of a treaty).
52. 2 H. CROTIUS, DE JuRE BELLI Ac PAcis LiBrm TRES 394-97 (F. Kelsey trans. 1925).
53. E. DE VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 199 (J. Chitty trans. 1958).
54. See S. MALAWER, supra note 38, at 17-18.
55. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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Nineteenth and early twentieth century writers rarely men-
tioned the issue of unequal treaties, although the conclusion of these
treaties was a frequent practice. 56 Lawrence Oppenheim, while not
employing the term "unequal treaty" directly, addressed the ques-
tion of whether a treaty procured through military force is legally
binding. 57 Although Oppenheim recognized the principle that a
treaty without true consent lacked binding force, 58 he also main-
tained that "circumstances of urgent distress, such as . . .defeat in
war . . . would not invalidate the consent of a state to the terms of
a treaty." 59 He concluded, as did most Western scholars,60 that the
repudiation of any treaty, even one brought about by the threat or
use of force, was to be viewed as an unlawful repudiation under
international law.6 ' Thus, under the traditional Western approach
there existed no ambiguities in the law on this point. Unequal
treaties were absolutely binding.
2. The Vienna Convention and Article 52
a. The Convention
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties62 (Convention)
was the product of over fifteen years of work by the International
Law Commission, and two sessions of a 110 nation conference.6 3
The purpose of the Convention was to codify international law
according to article 13 of the United Nations Charter.6 4 A great deal
of controversy arose at the Convention because the members dif-
fered as to which laws constituted existing rules of international
law, rather than developing rules. The conflicting views of the
56. See 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 547 (1912). Oppenheim's discussion of a
state's right to repudiate a treaty procured by force does not make reference to unequal
treaties. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
61. L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 56, at 547.
62. Vienna Convention, supra note 35.
63. Kearney & Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 495 (1970).
64. Id. Article 13 provides: "The General Assembly shall initiate studies and make
recommendations for the purpose of: a) promoting international cooperation in the political
field and, b) encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codifica-
tion." U.N. CHARTER art. 13, para. l(a).
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delegates caused a simple codification of accepted rules of law to
become an arduous task. 65 This confusion has been aptly noted:
[I]t is reasonable to expect that, of all the areas of international
law, the law of treaties would have become the most thoroughly
developed . . . However, as late as 1935, the introductory
comment to the Harvard Draft Commission on the Law of
Treaties remarked that "at the threshold of this subject one
encounters the fact that there is no clear and well-defined law of
treaties. "66
It was this appraisal of treaty law that the Vienna Convention
sought to rectify.
b. Unequal Treaties Under the Vienna Convention
The following four elements have been identified by twentieth
century scholars as rendering a treaty unequal:6 7 1) coercion of a
state by the threat or use of force;68 2) personal intimidation;' 3)
changed circumstances; 70 and, 4) economic or political pressure. 71
65. Kearney & Dalton, supra note 63, at 496.
66. Id.; see also Research in International Law Under the Auspices of the Faculty of the
Harvard Law School, Law of Treaties, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 653, 666 (Supp. 1935).
67. Varma, supra note 10, at 57. These elements have been codified under separate
articles of the Vienna Convention because each has a distinct legal effect on the binding force
of treaties. See infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
68. See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 9) at 74-75, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.1 (1966), reprinted in 61 AM. J. INT'L
L. 253, 408 (1967) [hereinafter cited as I.L.C. Report]. Article 52 of the Vienna Convention
renders treaties procured through the threat or use of force void ab initio. I.L.C. Report,
supra, at 74-75; see infra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
69. A state's consent, procured by the coercion of its representative through intimida-
tion directed against him personally, has long been recognized as invalid. See I.L.C. Report,
supra note 68, at 409. This rule has been codified in article 51 of the Vienna Convention.
Vienna Convention, supra note 35, art. 51.
70. Article 62 of the Vienna Convention deals with a fundamental change of circum-
stances "which has occurred with regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a
treaty." Vienna Convention, supra note 35, art. 62. It is a rule of limited application which
may not be invoked unless the existence of the changed circumstances was essential, and the
change radically effects the obligations under the treaty. Id. Even if these circumstances are
present, the doctrine still may not be applied if the treaty establishes a border, or the change
is a result of a breach by the party invoking the rule. Id.
Article 62 is subject to these restrictions because jurists are concerned with protecting the
security of treaties against the invocation of article 62 (also known as the doctrine of rebus sic
stantibus). I.L.C. Report, supra note 68, at 428. Thus, alleging a fundamental change of
circumstances does not necessarily result in the termination of a treaty. See generally A.
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These elements are codified separately under the Vienna Conven-
tion because each has a different impact on the binding effect of a
treaty.7 2 Any of the above elements taken separately renders a
treaty unequal, but under current 73 international law only the first
two circumstances result in the automatic invalidity of an unequal
treaty.7
4
c. Article 52
Article 52 of the Convention creates an exception to the pacta
sunt servanda rule. 75 It states that "[a] treaty is void if its conclusion
has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the
principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the
United Nations. '7 The exception, however, is more narrow than it
appears.
The scope of article 52 hinges on the interpretation of the word
"force. ' 77 This term was the subject of a substantial controversy
DAVID, TlE STRATEGY OF TREATY TERMINATION 3-55 (1975) (analysis of rebus sic stantibus);
Lissitzyn, Treaties and Changed Circumstances, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 895-902 (1967).
71. Economic and political coercion used in concluding a treaty are not made illegal
under any article of the Vienna Convention, but they are prohibited by a Declaration in the
Final Act. Vienna Convention, supra note 35, Final Act. For an explanation of the difference
between the articles of the Convention and the Final Act, see infra note 77. Western states
adamantly refused to include these types of coercion in the definition of the word "force" in
article 52. See Malawer, A New Concept of Consent and World Public Order: "Coerced
Treaties" and the Convention on the Law of Treaties, 4 VAND. INT'L 1, 19-20 (1970). The
fear of instability in treaty relations was the primary reason for the refusal of European and
industrialized states. Id. at 21. Also, there was the suggestion that applying economic and
political pressure is normal procedure between states and, therefore, these types of coercion
are not recognized as being illegal. See Waldock, Second Report on the Law of Treaties,
[1963] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 36, 52, U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/156/Add.1-3.
As to the effect of the Declaration against economic and political coercion, Stuart
Malawer states that it is a matter of interpretation: "If [the] restrictive definition of 'force'
... is accepted 'force' will be limited to military force. . . . [I]f a broad interpretation. . . is
adopted, then defining 'force' as economic and political ...would be justifiable." Malawer,
supra, at 24-25. Thus, the effect of these types of coercion may depend on the voting
distribution of the "old" and "new" states in the United Nations. Id.
72. See supra notes 68-71.
73. The term current refers to the rule of law as recognized by the Vienna Convention.
See supra notes 69-70.
74. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
75. S. MALAWER, supra note 38, at 5.
76. See Vienna Convention, supra note 35, art. 52.
77. See Kearney & Dalton, supra note 63, at 532-33. The International Law Commis-
sion's original version of article 52 failed to specifically prohibit economic and political
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among the participants in the conference. 78 The European and
industrialized countries were concerned that the creation of a broad
exception to pacta sunt servanda would encourage states to evade
treaty obligations they found onerous. 79 Consequently, many West-
ern nations advocated restricting the word "force" to the threat or
use of military force.8 0 On the other hand, various Asian and third
world states wanted the term "force" to encompass economic and
political coercion.81 A compromise solution was reached by includ-
ing a Declaration in the Final Act of the Convention 82 that pro-
hibits "military, political or economic coercion in the conclusion of
treaties. '8 3 Article 52, however, is restricted to those unequal trea-
ties involving military force. 84
The International Court of Justice provided insight into the
conditions that activate article 52 in the Fisheries Jurisdiction
case.85 The case was brought by Great Britain to challenge Iceland's
coercion. I.L.C. Report, supra note 68, at 407, para. 3. In response to this version, an
amendment to change the text to include "economic and political pressure" was proposed but
not adopted. Kearney & Dalton, supra note 63, at 533. Instead, the Convention agreed to
prohibit these forms of coercion in a separate declaration in the Final Act. See supra note 35.
The PRC was not yet a member of the United Nations and so did not participate in the
Convention. It became a member of the United Nations in 1971. 4 CHINA READER: PEOPLE'S
CHINA 1966 THROUGH 1972 (D. Milton, N. Milton & F. Schurmann eds. 1974) [hereinafter
cited as CHINA READER]. The PRC's status as a nonmember, however, does not affect the
applicability of article 52. The Drafters purposely phrased the principles regarding the threat
or use of force in terms of general international law. I.L.C. Report, supra note 68, at 408.
The phrase "violation of the principles of the Charter," rather than "violation of the Char-
ter," was chosen "in order that the article should not appear to be confined in its application
to [the] Members of the United Nations." Id.
78. See supra notes 71, 77 and accompanying text.
79. See supra note 71.
80. See id.
81. See supra notes 71, 77.
82. Article 52 was interpreted by the members of the Convention as solely prohibiting
the threat or use of military force. See supra note 71. The Final Act includes a prohibition of
political or economic coercion used to impose treaties. Vienna Convention, supra note 35,
Final Act. For a discussion of the legal effects of the Declaration, see supra note 71.
83. Vienna Convention, supra note 35, Final Act; see Kearney & Dalton, supra note 63,
at 535.
84. See I. SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 96-97 (1973)
(describing the gradual development of the rule prohibiting the threat or use of force in
concluding treaties, and the International Law Commissions' recognition of this rule). The
Commission has stated that it "considers ... that the invalidity of a treaty procured by the
illegal threat or use of force is a principle which is lex lata in the international law of today."
I.L.C. Report, supra note 68, at 407 para. 1.
85. Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1973 I.C.J. (Jurisdiction of the Court, Judg-
ment of Feb. 2, 1973).
544 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 7:534
proposed extension of its fisheries jurisdiction from 12 to 50 miles
around its shores.86 Iceland claimed that Notes exchanged between
the governments that purported to delineate the jurisdiction were
invalid. 87 Iceland's Minister of Foreign Affairs contended that
"[lthe 1961 Exchange of Notes took place . . . when the British
Royal Navy had been using force."8 8 The Court discussed the appli-
cation of article 52, stating: "There can be little doubt, as is implied
in the Charter of the United Nations and recognized in Article 52 of
the Vienna Convention . . . that under contemporary international
law an agreement concluded under the threat or use of force is
void."89
The decision recognized the limited exception to pacta sunt
servanda stated in article 52. In this particular case, however, the
court did not hold that the agreement lacked binding force, because
it found that there was insufficient evidence of the threat or use of
military force. 0 Thus, although an exception to pacta sunt ser-
vanda has evolved in cases involving unequal treaties imposed
through military force, it is an extremely narrow exception limited
to situations in which the threat or use of military force was indis-
putably employed. 91
3. The PRC's Concept of Unequal Treaties
a. Background
The twentieth century concept of unequal treaties was devel-
oped by the Soviet Union following the Russian Revolution, 2 and
86. Id. at 8.
87. Id. at 39.
88. Id. at 14.
89. Id.
90. The court analyzed the circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the Notes and
found the Notes to have been "freely negotiated by the interested parties on the basis of
perfect equality and freedom of decision." Id.; see Briggs, Unilateral Denunciation of Trea-
ties: The Vienna Convention and the International Court of Justice, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 51, 66
(1974) (discussing the Court's analysis).
91. See Briggs, supra note 90, at 56. For an interesting critique of article 52, discussing
the misguided idealism of the drafters and the basic impracticality of the rule, see Stone, De
Victoribus Victis: The International Law Commission and Imposed Treaties of Peace, 8 VA.
J. INT .L. 357 (1968). Stone states: "The writer.., while finding it morally outrageous that
such a treaty should be legally binding even if imposed. . . by a victorious 'aggressor,' on the
victim of 'aggression,' [has] seen no way of rescuing mankind by legal precept from this
particular kind of outrage." Id.
92. See Chiu, Certain Legal Aspects of Communist China's Treaty Practice, 1967 PRoc.
Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. 117, 119-20.
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was later used by Asian countries attempting to sever colonial
relationships with Western states. 3 After World War I, the term
"unequal" treaties was frequently used by these states and began
specifically to denote those nineteenth century treaties in which
"Western Powers forced Asian States to accept, inter alia, extra-
territorial jurisdiction, ...territorial cessions and liability to pay
tributes, etc." 94
As Asian and third world colonies obtained independence from
Western powers, they became concerned with achieving the status
of equal states in the international community. 95 If unequal treaties
were to remain binding, these states doubted that they could func-
tion effectively as sovereign equals.96 Thus, the concept of unequal
treaties was employed toward the practical goal of defeating obli-
gations that would undermine the independence of new states or
serve as a perpetual reminder of their former colonial status. 97
Therefore, unequal treaties can no longer be analyzed merely as a
theoretical problem involving moral violations of international
law.98 The practice of these states requires that the issue of unequal
treaties be framed in legal rather than moral terms. 99 This broad
view, however, is not a customary rule of international law. 100
93. See Varma, supra note 10, at 56.
94. Id.
95. L. CHEN, supra note 9, at 20-21.
96. See id.
97. See 0. UDOKANG, SUCCESSION OF NEW STATES TO INTERNATIONAL TREATIES 60 (1972).
A speech by the observer for the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee stated: "The
progressive development of international law was of particular interest to Asian and African
countries. . . .They were anxious to eradicate all vestiges of colonialism and foreign domina-
tion." Summary Records of the 745th Meeting, [1964] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 139, 140,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1964.
98. See Detter, The Problem of Unequal Treaties, 15 INT'L & COmP. L.Q. 1069 (1966).
"For as new States have been born, States that feel entitled to the same treatment and to the
same rights as the Great Powers, the problem has ceased to be of primarily doctrinal interest;
it has an immediate bearing on the practice of States." Id.
99. See id.; supra note 51.
100. H. KELSEN, supra note 35, at 440 (citing Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266
(Judgment of Nov. 20)). The Court formulated elements of custom as follows: "The Party
which relies on custom . . . must prove that this custom is established in soch a manner that it
has become binding on the other Party. [The Party] must prove that the rule invoked by it is
in accordance with a constant and uniform usage practiced by the States in question ... .
1950 I.C.J. at 276.
The rule prohibiting economic and political coercion in procuring treaties is not a
customary rule of law. See I.L.C. Report, supra note 68, at 407, para. 3. It was not included
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Article 52 recognizes only unequal treaties imposed by the threat or
use of military force as void.' 0 '
b. The PRC's Position
The PRC's concept of unequal treaties has not wavered or been
subject to reinterpretation, despite the fact that its position on
various political issues has often shifted. 0 2 The PRC has consist-
ently emphasized the illegality and invalidity of such treaties. 10 3
Although the PRC has not specifically articulated criteria that
would serve as a definition of an unequal treaty, a 1958 article
stated:
Treaties can be classified into equal and unequal treaties and the
latter undermine the most fundamental principles of interna-
tional law-such as the principle of sovereignty; therefore they
are illegal and void, and states have the right to abrogate this
type of treaty at any time. 10 4
The right to abrogate unequal treaties is the essence of the
Chinese concept. 10 5 This concept directly conflicts with the tradi-
tional Western approach because the notion that unequal treaties
fall within an exception to the rule pacta sunt servanda is inherent
in article 52 because a majority of states at the Convention believed that the rule was merely
developing. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
101. S. MALAWER, supra note 38, at 9. "Unequal," by itself, means that the terms of the
treaty are not reciprocal. See id. However, the term "unequal" also refers to the means by
which a treaty is concluded. See id. The term "unequal imposed treaties" then refers
specifically to treaties with unreciprocal terms that have been procured through the threat or
use of force. Id.
102. See CHINA READER, supra note 77 (discussing changes occurring in recent Chinese
culture because of the ongoing spirit of revolution). An example of the PRC's consistency in its
interpretation of unequal treaties is found in I PEOPLE'S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 6, at 385 (quoting the Letter from the Chinese Ambassador Huang Hua to the
Chairman of the U.N. General Assembly's Special Committee on Colonialism). The Chinese
Ambassador wrote: "With regard to the questions of Hong Kong and Macao, the Chinese
government has consistently held that they should be settled in an appropriate way when
conditions are ripe." Id.
103. See Chiu, supra note 92, at 120.
104. Id.
105. Id. The discussion of unequal treaties was framed in terms of abrogation in both
the Nationalist Government's proclamation to abolish unequal treaties in 1928 and various
PRC statements on the subject. Id.
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in the PRC's approach. 10 6 A Chinese text on international treaty
law further elucidates the PRC's position:
The classical writers of Marxism-Leninism opposed the under-
mining of international treaties at will; they regarded the per-
formance of equal international obligations as a fundamental
principle of the whole body of international law. They, how-
ever, considered the international law principle of pacta sunt
servanda . . . not to be applicable to treaties involving aggres-
sion and slavery.107
Although the PRC's position directly conflicts with the West's em-
phasis on the binding force of treaties, there is nothing in the PRC's
concept that theoretically conflicts with Western principles of inter-
national law. 10 8 For example, it has been observed that the PRC's
reasons for invalidating unequal treaties can be justified by princi-
ples set forth in the Charter of the United Nations. 09 One scholar
stated that the Chinese rationale for abrogating unequal treaties:
can be justified by legal principles acceptable to the West. For
example, the United Nations Charter clearly sets forth the fun-
damental importance of the principles of sovereign equality,
national self-determination, the prohibition of the use or threat
of force in international relations, et cetera. Thus, a treaty
which violates one or more of these principles would be not only
"unequal" but inconsistent with the Charter and thereby invalid
under Article 103 of the Charter. 1"'
In fact, there is no theoretical conflict between the two conceptions
of unequal treaties. The disagreement can be analyzed as merely a
difference in degree."' The West places more emphasis on the
106. See generally 2 PEOPLE'S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 1118 (J. Cohen & H.
Chiu eds. 1974) (excerpt from Wang Yao-t'ien's textbook on international treaties which
discusses the Marxist analysis of unequal treaties in relation to the doctrine pacta sont
servanda) [hereinafter cited as 2 PEOPLE'S CHINA].
107. Id. at 1118-19.
108. See Chiu, supra note 92, at 125. This work discusses particular treaties where the
PRC's position on the validity of treaties "does not seem unreasonable, even in light of
Western legal principles." Id.
109. Chiu, supra note 92, at 126.
110. Id.
111. Id.; see also G. Scorr, supra note 26, at 76 (providing analysis of the two concepts
of unequal treaties).
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binding force of treaties, while the PRC focuses on other accepted
principles of international law which it considers more important
than requiring strict adherence to unequal treaties. 112 Additionally,
the Charter of the United Nations, which is the product of modern
principles of international law, lends strong support to the PRC's
nontraditional approach to unequal treaties. 3
The result of the PRC's emphasis on the deleterious effect of
unequal treaties is that the PRC's interpretation of the term "une-
qual" is substantially broader than the Western interpretation." 4
Included in the PRC's definition are treaties procured through
economic and political coercion.' 15 In this precept, it is aligned
with Other Asian and third world countries that insisted at the
Vienna Convention that these forms of coercion should also be
illegal. ll6
B. Is The Treaty of Nanking Within An Exception?
1. The Invalidation of Consent by Coercion: Article 52
Article 52 of the Vienna Convention renders void ab initio
treaties procured by the threat or use of force. 117 Facially, the
circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the Treaty of Nanking
appear to be the type of aggressive military coercion envisioned by
the participants of the Convention as warranting the application of
112. See L. CHEN, supra note 9, at 32 ("It has been pointed out that the essential
difference between Western and Eastern theorists with regard to treaty-making is that
Eastern theorists hold that the elements of consent, equality and freedom of acceptance are
absolute while their Western counterparts hold that such elements are relative.") (footnote
omitted); see also J. TRISKA & R. SLUSSER, THE THEORY, LAW AND POLICIES OF SOVIEr TREATIES
105 (1962) (describing Soviet approaches to these principles).
113. Chiu, supra note 92, at 126.
114. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
115. Chiu, supra note 92, at 120. While the PRC emphasizes the equities of their
position, it is of interest to note that when writers discuss the PRC's concept of unequal
treaties, some have focused on the fact that the concept is not purely legal but subject to
political factors. See id. at 121-22; see also G. Scoair, supra note 26, at 96 (recognizing Chiu's
position). But see id. (providing the opposite view through illustrations of the PRC's sincer-
ity). Additionally, Scott points out that because the PRC has not always sustained a "logical
and consistent pattern in the abrogation of treaties under the unequal treaties principle,"
accusations have been made to the effect that the PRC is an "international outlaw." Id.
116. Varma, supra note 10, at 64.
117. I.L.C. Report, supra note 68, at 408, para. 6.
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article 52.118 Therefore, the Treaty of Nanking would be void under
the Vienna Convention.
This facile solution doesnot take into consideration the princi-
ple of nonretroactivity provided for in article 4 of the Vienna
Convention."19 Article 4 states that if any article of the Convention
is merely a codification of a pre-existing rule of international law,
then the principle of nonretroactivity applies "[w]ithout prejudice
to the application of any rules set forth in the present Convention to
which treaties would be subject under international law indepen-
dently of the Convention." 20 Thus, article 4 differentiates between
rules promulgated by the Convention that are a codification of
existing rules of customary international law, and those that reflect
the progressive development of treaty law.' 2' This distinction is
significant because the latter rules fall within the scope of the
nonretroactivity principle.
The Commission's approach to the retroactive effect of article
52 was based on its understanding of the historical development of
the rule codified therein. 2 2 This development has been divided into
three epochs: "(i) prior to the Covenant of the League of Nations;
(ii) the period of the Covenant and the Pact of Paris; (iii) the
consolidation of the law in the Charter of the United Nations and
the practice of the United Nations itself."'1 23 The Treaty of Nanking
falls into the first epoch because it was concluded prior to the
Covenant of the League of Nations. 24 Thus, the application of the
principle of nonretroactivity is clearly warranted.2 5
118. For a discussion of the background on the military force employed by the British to
win the opium war and impose the Treaty of Nanking, see supra notes 18-27 and accompany-
ing text.
119. Vienna Convention, supra note 35, art. 4.
120. Id.
121. Rosenne, The Temporal Application of the Vienna Convention, 4 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 2 (1970). Paragraph 7 of the preamble to the Convention states that the members of the
Convention believe "that the codification and progressive development of the law of treaties
achieved in the present Convention will promote the purposes of the United Nations." Vienna
Convention, supra note 35, preamble, para. 7. The Convention has a dual purpose, one of
which is the progressive development of the law of treaties. Rosenne, supra at 2.
122. Rosenne, supra note 121, at 13. The International Law Commission did not specify
whether the rule was a codification of a pre-existing rule or the progressive development of
the law within most of the articles. Id. at 2.
123. Id. at 13 (footnote omitted).
124. Id.
125. See infra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
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In discussing the retroactive effect of article 52, the Commis-
sion stated that, "there is no question of the article having retroac-
tive effects on the validity of treaties concluded prior to the estab-
lishment of the modern law."'' 26 The Commission relied on the
"celebrated dictum" of Judge Huber in the Isle of Palmas arbitra-
tion in reaching this conclusion. 27 The intertemporal rule of law
contained in Isle of Palmas states, in effect, that "a juridical fact
must be appreciated in the light of the law contemporary with it,
and not of the law in force at the time when a dispute in regard to it
arises or falls (sic) to be settled."'1 28 The Commission adopted this
approach by stating: "An evolution of the law governing the condi-
tions for the carrying out of a legal act does not operate to deprive
of validity a legal act already accomplished in conformity with the
law previously in force.' 2  Thus, in determining whether the
Treaty of Nanking may be invalidated by the rule expressed in
article 52, the key issue is to determine the rule of law in effect in
1842.130
The customary rules of international law in 1842"1 permitted
treaties to be imposed on states by the threat or use of force.13 2
Comments by the delegates to the Vienna Convention, 33 and state-
126. I.L.C. Report, supra note 68, at 408, para. 7 (footnote omitted). The date con-
cerning the establishment of the new rule against imposed treaties has caused considerable
disagreement. See S. MALAWER, supra note 38, at 18-19. The majority of nations do agree,
however, that "[t]he traditional doctrine prior to the Covenant of the League of Nations was
that the validity of a treaty was not affected by the fact that it had been brought about by the
threat or use of force." I.L.C. Report, supra note 68, at 407, para. 1.
127. Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 829, 845 (1928).
128. Rosenne, supra note 121, at 13. For another interpretation of the intertemporal
rule of law reached in Island of Palnas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 829, 845
(1928), see Jessup, The Palmas Island Arbitration, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 735, 740-41 (1928).
129. I.L.C. Report, supra note 68, at 409. The Commission made it clear that article 52
would not apply to treaties concluded prior to modern law by noting that "the present article
concerns the conditions . . . for the creation of a legal relation by treaty." Id. at 408-09.
130. See infra notes 131-37 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
132. See U.N. Conference, supra note 43, at 90-92.
133. Mr. Escudero, the delegate from Ecuador stated:
The date of the Briand-Kellogg Pact [1928] was clearly the date from which the
principles of international law now embodied in the United Nations Charter had
come into force. Between 1928 and the signing of the Charter in 1945, the prohibi-
tion of the use of force had become a peremptory norm of international law.
Id. at 91.
Peremptory norms of international law, also known as jus cogens, are principles which
are universally recognized by the international community. See J. STARKE, supra note 49, at
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ments in the Commentary1 34 suggest that article 52 may be applied
retroactively only to treaties concluded after 1921 .135 A minority of
states of the "older order"1 3 view article 52 as a codification of a
progressively developing rule of law, and therefore they do not
believe it may be retroactively applied. 137
The PRC, which was not a member of the United Nations and
thus did not participate in the Convention,138 does not agree with
the Convention's position on the nonretroactivity of rules invalidat-
ing treaties procured by coercion. 39 In fact, representatives of the
PRC have stated that the principles expressed in the Final Act of the
Convention that outlaw coercion through military, political or eco-
nomic pressure 40 are actually "based on long accepted standards of
international law and therefore are applicable to all treaties, past,
63. The fact that article 52 is now recognized as a peremptory norm of international law does
not change the retroactive retroactive effect of the rule. U.N. Conference, supra note 43, at
91. Article 53 codifies the rule of jus cogens: "A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion,
it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law." Vienna Convention, supra
note 35, art. 53; see also RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FoREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 339 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1980). The pertinent language concerning the retroactivity
of a peremptory norm of law is the reference to the time of a treaty's conclusion. In 1842,
when the Treaty of Nanking was concluded, no peremptory norm existed which prescribed
the use of force. See Rosenne, supra note 121, at 14. Therefore, article 52 does not apply. For
further analysis of jus cogens, see C. ROZAKIS, THE CONCEPT OF JUS COGENS IN THE LAW OF
TREATIES (1976).
134. The Commentary to the Draft Convention provided: "[Tihe emergence of a new
rule of ls cogens is not to have retroactive effects on the validity of a treaty. The invalidity is
to attach only as from the time of the establishment of the new rule of lus cogens." I.L.C.
Report, supra note 68, at 412, para. 6.
135. See supra note 133.
136. The "older order" refers to the highly industrialized Western European states.
Malawer, supra note 71, at 15.
137. Id.
138. The PRC became a member of the United Nations in 1971. G.A. Res. 2758, 26
U.N. GAOR (No. 29) at 2, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971). An analysis of the treaty relations of the
PRC is provided by Lee, Treaty Relations of the People's Republic of China: A Study in
Compliance, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 244 (1967). Lee finds that the PRC's record of compliance is
high, and notes that "treaties ... as expressions of consent, remain the logical source of
international law for China." Id. at 245 (footnote omitted). On the other hand, Lee mentions
that the PRC might justifiably feel reluctant to be bound by "Western customary law, in the
making of which it did not participate." Id. Thus, the PRC is presented with the dilemma of
standing outside of laws it had no part in promulgating, or upholding the laws of the
international community which might serve the PRC advantageously in the future.
139. See G. SCOTT, supra note 26, at 92.
140. A Declaration in the Final Act of the Vienna Convention "[s]olemnly condemns
the threat or use of pressure in any form, whether military, political, or economic, by any
State in order to coerce another State . . . to .. .[conclude] a treaty in violation of the
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present and future.' 14 ' From this statement, it is clear that the
PRC's position is in direct conflict with that of both the West and
the compromise approach indicated by the comments of delegates
to the Convention. 142 Although the PRC's position on its right to
invalidate the Treaty of Nanking seems irreconcilable with the
principle of nonretroactivity, this is not the case because the PRC
does not rely solely on this exception to pacta sunt servanda to
justify its claim that the Treaty of Nanking should be abrogated. 143
2. A Broad Unequal Treaty Exception
A broad conception of unequal treaties implies the right to
abrogate all unequal treaties, not only those imposed by military
force. 44 It is logical that the states that are encumbered by unequal
treaties left over from the nineteenth century would be those assert-
ing this position. 45 As these states have achieved independence,
there has been increasing acceptance in the international commu-
nity of a broad exception to pacta sunt servanda based on unequal
treaties in the context of state succession. 14 These successor states,
former colonies, began the practice of invalidating unequal treaties
by their refusal to succeed to them.147 It is within this context that
the PRC has framed its right to abrogate the Treaty of Nanking. 148
principles of the sovereign equality of States and freedom of consent." Vienna Convention,
supra note 35, Final Act. For a discussion of the effects of the Declaration, see supra note 71.
141. See G. Scorr, supra note 26, at 92 (footnote omitted).
142. See generally U.N. Conference, supra note 43, at 90-92 (delegates' comments
concerning the retroactive effect of article 52).
143. In framing its claim that it is not bound by 19th century coerced treaties, such as
the Treaty of Nanking, supra note 2, the PRC has emphasized its right to selectively accept
such treaties as a new governing entity. See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
145. The new states base their right to broadly invalidate unequal treaties on the fact
that such treaties not only imply inequality of obligations but inequality of relationships. 0.
UDOKANC, supra note 97, at 93.
146. See L. CHEN, supra note 9, at 44-46 (listing the reasons for carving a large
exception into the pacta sunt servanda doctrine). Chen notes that including economic and
political coercion in the definition of force "will not weaken the rule of pacta sunt servanda.
In terms of justice and equality, a 'coercive' and 'predatory' treaty does not deserve the
application of the rule of pacta sunt servanda." Id. at 46 (footnote omitted). He further
concludes that it is regretable that the states holding this position are divided along the lines
of old and new states. Id. at 47.
147. See infra notes 165-69 and accompanying text. The practice of new successor states
has not been consistent and has reflected the lack of a concensus among international
scholars. See S. MALAWER, supra note 38, at 25.
148. See injra notes 188-93 and accompanying text.
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a. Traditional Rule of State Succession
State succession to treaties has been a particularly controversial
area of the law since World War II when the number of new states
burgeoned.1 49 State succession occurs when one state ceases to exist
or govern in a specific territory and is replaced by another state.
1 50
Historically, state succession arose through annexation, cession, or
the dismembering of a federal state.' 5 ' Since the formation of the
United Nations, however, the typical form of state succession has
been through the emergence of new states via the independence of
colonial territories. 152
The traditional rule of state succession to treaties 53 involved
the classification of treaties as either personal 54 or dispositive.'
55
149. The growing number of new states since 1945 is a significant development in
international law. Thus Bokor-Szego, in examining the relation of new states to international
law, provides the following data:
The first Hague Peace Conference (1899) was attended by 26 States, the second
(1907) by 44 States. Among the latter there were only five Asian nations, while
Africa was not represented at all. The League of Nations had 45 original members,
among them six Asian and two African States; subsequently five more Afro-Asian
States were admitted into the League. In 1945 the United Nations Organization was
originally established by 51 States, among them only four from Africa and nine from
Asia. On 1 May 1968, the Organization had 124 Members, including 40 from Africa
and 29 from Asia. Another characteristic figure: of the 124 States Members of the
United Nations a round sixty (36 African, 20 Asian and 4 American) States have
been established after 1945!
H. BOKOa-SzEco, NEW STATES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 52 (1970) (citations omitted).
150. D. O'CONNELL, THE LAW OF STATES SUCCESSION 1 (1956).
151. See L. CHEN, supra note 9, at 8-9.
152. Id. at 10.
153. The traditional rule here refers to a theory which was prevalent in the 19th century
called Negativism. For further analysis of this approach, see infra notes 154-57 and accompa-
nying text. Prior to the 19th century, the earliest theories in modern international law
involved extrapolations of Roman law. L. CHEN, supra note 9, at 15-16; Note, SUCCESSION OF
STATES IN RESPECT OF TREATIES: THE VIENNA CONVENTION OF 1978, 19 VA. INT'L L.J. 885,
886 (1979). Under the theory of universal succession, all rights and obligations of the
"deceased" state passed in toto to the successor state. See H. GROTIUS, supra note 52, at 185-
86; S. PUFENDORF, ON THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS 1360 (C. Oldfather & W. Oldfather
trans. 1934),
154. The concept of personal treaties is analogous to the notion given to personality in
modern contract law. Note, supra note 153, at 887-88; see Kelley v. Thompson Land Co.,
112 W. Va. 454, 164 S.E. 667 (1932). When a state concludes a treaty with another state, the
relationship is considered personal. See D. O'CONNELL, supra note 150, at 16-17. Thus if one
state is extinguished, its treaties terminate because of impossibility of performance. Id.
Similarly, when a contract is based on the performance of personal services, it does not
survive the death of that party. Id.
155. The International Law Association defined dispositive treaties as those which: "a)
are in the nature of objective territorial regimes created in the interests of one nation or the
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"Personal treaties were non-inheritable, dispositive treaties were
inheritable, and no effort was made to distinguish the effects of
state succession on unequal and equal treaties. '" 156 Under this view,
the Treaty of Nanking, as a dispositive treaty,1 57 would still have
binding force.
New successor states are particularly concerned with the doc-
trine of equality of states and the eradication of unequal treaty
obligations.15  In the interest of ensuring the "integrity of [their]
sovereignty, their political independence and their status of equal-
ity in the world,"' 15 these states have often refused to succeed to
treaties that were "incompatible with the independence of ...
sovereign states.' ' 60 These successor states have developed practices
of nonsuccession to unequal treaties.16 ' The PRC has implicitly
analogized its position as a successor government burdened by un-
equal treaties to the position of successor states, and has accordingly
asserted the right to repudiate its predecessor's unequal treaties. 62
b. Current State Practice
Prior to World War II, state succession was usually accom-
plished gradually. 6 3 In contrast, during the post-World War II
decolonization period, states became independent "almost in one
step.' 4 The new successor states adopted five different succession
practices: 1) total rejection,16 5 2) devolution agreements, 6 6 3) tem-
community of nations; b) are applied locally in territorial application clauses; c) touch or
concern a particular area of land." INT'L LAW Assoc., THE EFFECr OF INDEPENDENCE ON
TREATIES 352 (1965).
156. L. CHEN, supra note 9, at 20 (footnote omitted).
157. The Treaty of Nanking, supra note 2, concerns the boundaries of China and thus
falls within the category of dispositive treaties. The law concerning dispositive, or real,
treaties originated out of the application of property rather than contract law. See L. CHEN,
supra note 9, at 141. The emphasis is not on the termination of the predecessor state, but on
the notion that title to property runs with the land. See E. OE VAl-rEL, supra note 53, at 169.
158. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
159. L. CHEN, supra note 9, at 235.
160. Id. See also [1962] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 114, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/150 (1962)
(memorandum on succession of states and governments) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum]
(footnote omitted).
161. See infra notes 165-86 and accompanying text.
162. See infra note 193 and accompanying text.
163. 0. UDO.ANG, supra note 97, at 165-66.
164. Id. at 186. See generally Keith, Succession to Bilateral Treaties by Seceding States,
61 AM. J. INT'L L. 521 (1967) (discussing practices of new states in succeeding to treaties).
165. L. CHEN, supra note 9, at 21.
166. Id. at 21-22. See, e.g., Memorandum, supra note 160, at 119.
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porary application, 67 4) selective acceptance, 6" and 5) deferment
of decision. 169
Total rejection involves repudiation of all the predecessor's
treaties, both equal and unequal. 70 An example of this approach
was Israel's refusal to succeed to Palestine's treaties.171 The other
four practices involve a determination of whether the treaties are
unequal. 172
Great Britain introduced the practice of concluding devolution
agreements to notify the international community that the succes-
sor state inherited all of the predecessor's treaty rights and obliga-
tions. 73 These agreements, however, have evolved into more flexi-
ble instruments whereby the successor may agree to succeed only to
equal treaties and ignore unequal ones. 7 4 Ignoring a treaty as
though it were void created an exception to pacta sunt servanda.
Thus, devolution agreements that rejected unequal treaties began
the practice of nonsuccession to unequal treaties.
The other three approaches are more straightforward. These
practices are based on the notion that a successor state should have
the opportunity to choose which treaties will continue in force. 75
Prime Minister Nyerere of Tanganyika, now Tanzania, devised the
first framework in which states may examine their predecessor's
treaties, accepting only those it deems equal. 76 The doctrine in-
volves a unilateral declaration that the successor state will analyze
its treaties for a period of two years to determine which are
167. L. CHEN, supra note 9, at 22-23.
168. Id. at 23-24. See Memorandum, supra note 160, at 115 (Letter from the Minister
for Foreign Affairs for the Republic of Congo to the Secretary General of the United Nations
advising the world of its policy of selective acceptance).
169. L. CHEN, supra note 9, at 24-25. See Memorandum, supra note 160, at 117 (Letter
from the Madagascar government to the Secretary General of the United Nations).
170. L. CHEN, supra note 9, at 21.
171. Id. Other states that applied the clean slate theory, or tabula rasa, in their rejection
of all of their predecessor's treaties were Algeria and Upper Volta. Id.
172. See infra notes 174-81 and accompanying text.
173. L. CHEN, supra note 9, at 21.
174. O'Connell, Independence and Succession to Treaties, 38 BraT. Y.B. INT'L L. 122-
28 (1962).
175. See infra notes 177, 179-80 and accompanying text.
176. Nyerere, Problems of State Succession in Africa: Statement of the Prime Minister of
Tanganyika, 11 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1210 (1962).
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equal.177 The Nyerere Doctrine has been followed by many African
states. 178
The other two approaches are similar, but less formal. Under
the deferment approach, new states are initially noncommittal and
wait until particular problems arise before deciding whether a
treaty is unequal.' 79 Selective acceptance is the practice advocated
by the Soviet Union and the PRC.18 0 It is a radical approach in that
no time limit is set to notify concerned states that a particular treaty
is considered invalid.181
c. Whether the Approaches Have Legal Effect
The legal validity of these practices is questionable. 18 2 When
the parties to a treaty mutually consent to invalidate it, however,
legal effect is given to their abrogation of that treaty.' 83 Although
successor states have sometimes reconsidered their refusal to suc-
ceed to treaties during negotiations, they have achieved some suc-
cess in freeing themselves from unequal treaties.' 8 4
Current international law prohibits the creation of unequal
treaties through coercion.' 8 5 From a policy perspective, however, it
may be a questionable practice to prohibit future coercion without
allowing relief from past injustices. States that have inequitable
obligations imposed upon them will not have reason to view the
177. 0. UDOKANG, supra note 97, at 199. One of the radical aspects of the Nyerere
Doctrine was the Prime Minister's refusal to conclude a devolution agreement with Great
Britain. For Great Britain's position on the declaration, see U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/214/Add.2, at
4 (1969).
178. Swaziland, Kenya, Malawi, Botswana, and Lesotho followed the lead of Tangan-
yika in adopting this approach in one form or another. L. CHEN, supra note 9, at 22.
179. Id. at 24.
180. For an examination of the PRC's position, see infra notes 193-94 and accompany-
ing text.
181. See Chiu, supra note 92, at 122-23.
182. See L. CHEN, supra note 9, at 217-18, 222-25. The question of whether devolution
agreements are unequal treaties in and of themselves has been raised by the International
Law Commission. H. BOKoR-SzEGO, supra note 149, at 111-14.
183. H. KELSEN, supra note 35, at 494.
184. Compare L. CHEN, supra note 9, at 179-85 (discussing African successor states'
problems with succession to unequal boundary treaties) with Nyerere, supra note 176, at
1210 (Prime Minister Nyerere's refusal to succeed to the Anglo-Belgium agreements gave
Belgium a perpetual lease and rights of passage in Tanganyika).
185. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
HONG KONG'S FUTURE
obligee nations as entities that desire to end the era of colonial-
ism. 18 6
3. The PRC's Right to Selectively Accept Treaties
Shortly after the PRC took over the government of China, it
announced its position on state succession to treaties. 18 7 Article 55 of
the Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consulta-
tive Conference states: "The Central People's Government of the
People's Republic of China shall examine the treaties and agree-
ments concluded between the Kuomintang and foreign govern-
ments, and shall recognize, abrogate, revise, or renegotiate them
according to their respective contents."'' 88 This policy has also been
applied to treaties concluded by the Imperial Chinese govern-
ment. 8 9
The PRC's view of the Treaty of Nanking was clarified in a
1963 editorial. 90 The writer reiterated the PRC's position that it
has the right to selectively accept treaties' 9 ' and directly referred to
the Treaty of Nanking as an unequal treaty:
[M]any of these treaties concluded in the past either have lost
their validity, or have been abrogated or have been replaced.
... With regard to the outstanding issues, which are a legacy
from the past, we have always held that, when conditions are
ripe, they should be settled peacefully through negotiations
186. See generally Rosenne, supra note 121, at 8 (describing the delegate from Bolivia's
concerns about the nonretroactivity of the rules of the Vienna Convention). The delegate
from Bolivia believed that excluding existing treaties "from the application of the Convention
• . . would be tantamount in many cases to setting the seal of approval on certain agreements
which were the cause of continual controversies." Id.
187. 1 PEOPLE'S CHINA, supra note 6, at 214.
188. Id.
189. G. ScoTT, supra note 26, at 81.
190. See supra note 6 (discussing the significance of an editorial in IMIP).
191. A Comment on the Statement of the Communist Party of the USA, JMJP, Mar. 8,
1963, reprinted in I PEOPLE'S CHINA, supra note 6, at 380.
Note that the PRC reserves the right to wait until conditions are "ripe." Id. According to
established principles of international law, the PRC would not be estopped from invalidating
the Treaty of Nanking if its reasons for abrogation are valid under the Vienna Convention.
"Waldocks original draft envisaged the principle [of estoppel] to apply to all causes of
invalidity. Opposition, however, was expressed in the Commission to the effect that in cases
of invalidity caused by jus cogens and coercion, principles such as estoppel . . . have no
place." Elreedy, The Main Features of the Concept of Invalidity in the Vienna Convention
on Treaties, 27 REVUE EGYPTIENNE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 13, 24 (1971). In this instance,
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.... Within this category are the questions of Hong Kong,
Kowloon and Macao .... 192
The PRC's claim that it has the right to selectively accept
treaties depends on an analogy to the rights of the successor
states. '93 The PRC's approach, however, like the Soviet Union's, has
been questioned on the grounds that it is not a successor state, but
merely a successor government.19 4
The traditional rule of international law concerning successor
governments is that governments inherit their predecessor's treaty
rights and obligations without qualification.9 5 The internal gov-
ernance of states is beyond the jurisdiction of international law,
thus the means by which a government succession is accomplished
falls outside the ambit of international concern.19
Succession in China did not occur through either the histori-
cal 9 7 or modern route'1 8 of state succession. Instead, a civil war led
to a radical change in the government.9 9 The PRC argues that the
revolutionary change in government was such a substantial permu-
tation as to be the equivalent of forming a new state.2 00 The PRC
the principle of nonretroactivity further complicates the issue. See supra notes 119-37 and
accompanying text.
192. 1 PEOPLE'S CHINA, supra note 6, at 380.
193. Both the PRC and the new successor states have renounced unequal treaties as
undermining their status as equal sovereigns. See L. CHEN, supra note 9, at 13.
194. Cf. Jackson v. People's Rep. of China, 550 F. Supp. 869, 872 (N.D. Ala. 1982). In
Jackson, the PRC chose not to appear and defend itself against a suit involving the PRC's
refusal to pay a U.S.$41.3 million debt on bonds issued to finance the 1911 Hukuang railroad
by the Imperial Chinese government. Id. at 877. The court found that "[t]he People's
Republic of China is the successor government to the Imperial Chinese Government and,
therefore, the successor to its obligations." Id. at 872.
195. 1 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE
UNITED STATES 158-59 (2d rev. ed. 1945) ("After a State has come into being, its obligations in
relation to the outside world are not affected in consequence of internal changes which may
be undergone.").
196. See A. Ross, A TEXTBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 134 (1947).
197. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
199. See Jackson v. People's Rep. of China, 550 F. Supp. 869, 872 (N.D. Ala. 1982).
The court characterized the PRC's entry into power as the seizure of control. Many authors
believe that changes in government do not terminate treaties and imply that revolutions are
changes in government alone. See, e.g., 5 C. HACKWOnTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
360 (1944); 1 J. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 249 (1906); A. McNAI, THE LAW OF
TREA.TIES 668-76 (2d ed. 1961).
The literature on revolutions is vast, See, e.g., H. AHRENDT, ON REVOLUTION (1963); C.
BRINTON, THE ANATOMY OF REVOLUTION (rev. ed. 1952); E. HOaSBAUM, THE AGE OF REVOLU-
TION, EUROPE 1789-1848 (1962).
200. See 2 PEOPLE'S CHINA, supra note 106, which noted that: "[allthough [the question
whether] the Soviet Union is a new state or the continuation of the old Russian state ...
1984] HONG KONG'S FUTURE
recognizes the rule of government succession but does not consider
it binding. 211 In refusing to adhere to its predecessor's treaties the
PRC ignores the principle of international law that a successor
government is required "to perform the obligations undertaken on
behalf of the state by its predecessor. 20 2
Historically, the law of state succession has been a controver-
sial area, 0 3 whereas rules applicable to government succession have
been undisputed until recently.20 4 Yet, because the PRC's position is
analogous to successor states, it is not unreasonable for the PRC to
claim the right to selectively accept its predecessor's treaties. 20 5 The
created controversy among Soviet jurists, it was apparent that to some extent Soviet practice
provided a precedent" which supported the PRC's position. Id. at 1122.
O'Connell concludes that the distinction between government and state succession is
artificial:
If there is any rubric, therefore, to which one could resort as a touchstone for the
solution of all problems of political change over territory it might be this: that the
consequences of such change should be measured according to the degree of politi-
cal, economic and social disruption which occurs.
1 D. O'CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION IN MUNICIPAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW Vi (1967).
In discussing the complexity of determining whether a revolution is so substantial as to
change the social and economic structure of a state as well as its political institutions, one
writer noted: "Revolutionary change may be like hard-core pornography: one knows it when
one sees it." Note, Revolutions, Treaties, and State Succession, 76 YALE L.J. 1669, 1683
(1967). Cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
201. See Statement by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on
Agreements and Negotiations between the Kuomintang and Foreign Governments, Hsin-hua
Jih-pao (New China Daily) Feb. 1, 1947, reprinted in 2 PEOPLE'S CHINA, supra note 106, at
1120-22.
202. Id.
203. For discussion and analysis of the different views on state succession, see E.
FEILCHENFELD, PUBLIC DEBTS AND STATE SUCCESSION (1931); 2 D. O'CONNELL, supra note
200; Aufright, State Succession under the Law and Practice of the International Monetary
Fund, 11 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 154 (1962); Delson, Comments on State Succession, 1966
Psoc. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 111; Jenks, State Succession in Respect of Law-making Treaties,
[1952] 29 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 105; Verbit, State Succession in the New States, 1966 Peoc. AM.
Soc'Y INT'L L, 119.
204. See RESTATEMENT (REvISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 208 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981). The Reporters' Notes clearly distinguish state and govern-
ment succession: "International law sharply distinguished the succession of states which may
create a discontinuity in statehood, from a succession of governments which leaves statehood
unaffected." Id. at 35, n.2.
The Soviet Union was the state that originally took issue with this traditional distinction.
After the Russian revolution "the new regime sought to insist that it was not merely a new
government, but represented a new state, and that the U.S.S.R. was not responsible for the
international obligations assumed by the previous regime." Id. The PRC's assertion that it
may selectively accept treaties indicates its disavowal of the traditional rule of government
succession. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
205. See 1 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 200, at 6. O'Connell dismisses the distinction
between state and government succession as antiquated. Id. However, the International Law
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PRC is as much the victim of unequal treaties as successor states. In
addition, the Chinese revolution produced a change of political
system so radical that the status of the PRC is closer to that of a
successor state than that of a successor government. 0 6
CONCLUSION
The PRC claims that it is justified in abrogating the Treaty of
Nanking under accepted principles of international law. 20 7 For the
claim to have validity, it must fall within an exception to the
doctrine of pacta sunt servanda.°8 Two possible exceptions to this
doctrine exist.
The first exception involves article 52 of the Vienna Conven-
tion which appears to render the Treaty of Nanking void. 209 The
nonretroactivity principle in article 4 of the Vienna Convention,
however, subverts this conclusion. 210 Thus the second exception,
which arises in the context of state succession, is the more signifi-
cant one and the one under which the PRC has framed its right to
invalidate the Treaty of Nanking. 211
The law regarding state succession to unequal treaties has been
developing since 1945.212 During this period, because of the increas-
ing number of new states and the lack of uniformity in state prac-
tice, nations involved in treaty relations with these states have
recognized new approaches of succession to treaties.2 1 3 The fact that
these new practices are still developing and are not yet solidified
into generally accepted principles of international law means that
there is no settled rule governing a state's right to refuse to succeed
to its predecessor's unequal treaties. Therefore, the PRC's claim
that it has the right to abrogate the Treaty of Nanking may fall into
the state succession exception to the rule of pacta sunt servanda.
Katherine A. Greenberg
Commission supports the distinction. See [1963] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 262, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.4/214, at 5 (1969).
206. See supra notes 199-201 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 75-84 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 119-30 and accompanying text.
211. See su pra notes 144-48 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 95-100, 149 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 163-84 and accompanying text.
